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  • Auctions and market makers

Auctions and market makers#

Truthful bidding, the revenue-maximizing auction, and a market maker for predictions.

Vickrey’s second-price auction: truthful bidding (1961)

Vickrey's second-price auction: truthful bidding (1961)

Myerson’s optimal auction and revenue equivalence (1981)

Myerson's optimal auction and revenue equivalence (1981)

Hanson’s logarithmic market scoring rule (2003)

Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (2003)

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Vickrey’s second-price auction: truthful bidding (1961)

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